tailieunhanh - Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses

To put the odds ratios of these genetic markers in context, let’s consider the effect size of the above mentioned environmental risk factors that physicians currently use to assess patients’ likelihood of myocardial infarction. The effect size of the genetic markers 9p21 and MTHFD1L equals or surpasses the effect size of most of the currently recognized medical risk factors -- an insight which many physicians may find illuminating. Furthermore, the Navigenics risk score combines the effect of multiple independent genetic risk factors which leads to even more discrimination of risk from non-risk. In the case of myocardial infarction, if an. | Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses Daniel Halperin University of Washington Shane S. Clark University of Massachusetts Amherst Kevin Fu PhD University of Massachusetts Amherst Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin University of Massachusetts Amherst Benessa Defend University of Massachusetts Amherst Tadayoshi Kohno PhD University of Washington Benjamin Ranslord University of Massachusetts Amherst Will Morgan University of Massachusetts Amherst William H. Maisel MD MPH BIDMC and Harvard Medical School Abstract Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator ICD . Introduced to the . market in 2003 this model of ICD includes pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD s communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio we implemented several software radio-based attacks that could compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by our desire to improve patient safety and mindful of conventional trade-offs between security and power consumption for resource-constrained devices we introduce three new zero-power defenses based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are humancentric bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security and privacy of their implantable medical devices IMDs . Our contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding the potential security and privacy risks of current and future IMDs and introduce human-perceptible and zero-power mitigation techniques that address those risks. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first in our community to use general-purpose software radios to analyze and attack previously unknown radio communications protocols. I. INTRODUCTION Wirelessly reprogrammable implantable medical devices IMDs such as pacemakers implantable .