Đang chuẩn bị liên kết để tải về tài liệu:
The Supply and Demand Side Impacts of Credit Market Information

Đang chuẩn bị nút TẢI XUỐNG, xin hãy chờ

In this research report, Aliou Diagne and Manfred Zeller examine the case of Malawi, where several institutions offer credit to poor, smallholder farmers to allow them to buy fertilizer, seeds, and other inputs for growing maize and tobacco as a way of helping raise incomes. Surprisingly, they find that farmers who participated in these credit programs ended up with less net crop income than those who did not. Their results make clear that the conditions surrounding credit programs must be right—that is, they must reflect the actual opportunities and constraints faced by poor farmers—for credit to work effectively. For example, credit is not of much use in. | The Supply and Demand Side Impacts of Credit Market Information Alain de Janvry Craig McIntosh and Elisabeth Sadoulet September 2006 Abstract We utilize a unique pair of experiments to study the precise ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter the outcome in a credit market. We formulate a general model in which the information set held by lenders and what borrowers believe their lenders to know enter separately. This model illustrates that non-experimental identification of the supply- and demand-side information in a market will be confounded. We then present a unique natural experiment wherein a Guatemalan credit bureau was implemented without the knowledge of borrowers and subsequently borrowers were given a randomized course describing the existence and workings of the bureau. Using this pairing of randomized and natural experiment we find that the most powerful effect of new information in the hands of lenders is seen on the extensive margin in their ability to select better clients. Changes in contracts for ongoing borrowers are muted. When borrower in group loans learn that their lender possesses this new information set on the other hand we see strong responses on both the intensive margin changes in moral hazard and the extensive margin groups changing their composition to improve performance . We find some evidence that disadvantaged and female borrowers are disproportionately impacted. Our results indicate that credit bureaus allow for large efficiency gains that these gains are augmented when borrowers understand the rules of the game and that economic mobility both upwards and downwards is likely to be increased. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics U.C. Berkeley. Alain@are.berkeley.edu Sadoulet@are.berkeley.edu International Relations Pacific Studies U.C. San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla CA 92093-0519. ctmcintosh@ucsd.edu We are indebted to Michael Carter Dean Karlan and Chris Woodruff for helpful guidance with this .