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Báo cáo khoa học: "Discourse Obligations in Dialogue Processing"

We show that in modeling social interaction, particularly dialogue, the attitude of obligation can be a useful adjunct to the popularly considered attitudes of belief, goal, and intention and their mutual and shared counterparts. In particular, we show how discourse obligations can be used to account in a natural manner for the connection between a question and its answer in dialogue and how obligations can be used along with other parts of the discourse context to extend the coverage of a dialogue system. . | Discourse Obligations in Dialogue Processing David R. Traum and James F. Allen Department of Computer Science University of Rochester Rochester NY 14627-0226 traum@cs.rochester.edu and james@cs.rochester.edu Abstract We show that in modeling social interaction particularly dialogue the attitude of obligation can be a useful adjunct to the popularly considered attitudes of belief goal and intention and their mutual and shared counterparts. In particular we show how discourse obligations can be used to account in a natural manner for the connection between a question and its answer in dialogue and how obligations can be used along with other parts of the discourse context to extend the coverage of a dialogue system. 1 Motivation Most computational models of discourse are based primarily on an analysis of the intentions of the speakers e.g. Cohen and Perrault 1979 Allen and Perrault 1980 Grosz and Sidner 1986 . An agent has certain goals and communication results from a planning process to achieve these goals. The speaker will form intentions based on the goals and then act on these intentions producing utterances. The hearer will then reconstruct a model of the speaker s intentions upon hearing the utterance. This approach has many strong points but does not provide a very satisfactory account of the adherence to discourse conventions in dialogue. For instance consider one simple phenomena a question is typically followed by an answer or some explicit statement of an inability or refusal to answer. The intentional story account of this goes as follows. From the production of a question by Agent B Agent A recognizes Agent B s goal to find out the answer and she adopts a goal to tell B the answer in order to be co-operative. A then plans to achieve the goal thereby generating the answer. This provides an elegant account in the simple case but requires a strong assumption of co-operativeness. Agent A must adopt agent B s goals as her own. As a result it does not explain