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The Economics of Bank Restructuring: Understanding the Options

A series of evaluations conducted by the World Bank’s Opera- tions Evaluation Department has shown that attention to gender issues helps to enhance the Bank’s development effectiveness. A 1997 desk review of projects conducted in the mid-1990s found that Bank projects that took gender relations into account in their design and implementation tended to achieve their objectives more often than projects that ignored gender issues. 26 A recent desk review of a variety of Bank instruments concluded that countries in which Country Gender Assessments had been performed tended to have a more thorough and effective treatment of gender issues in other ana- lytical work and in projects. 27 Likewise, an analysis by. | O S The Economics of Bank Restructuring Understanding the Options Augustin Landier and Kenichi Ueda INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND The Economics of Bank Restructuring Understanding the Options Prepared by the Research Department Augustin Landier and Kenichi Ueda1 June 4 2009 Contents Page Executive Summary.3 I. Introduction.4 II. A Benchmark Frictionless Framework.6 A. Setup.6 B. First Best Voluntary Debt Restructuring.7 III. Restructuring with No Debt Renegotiation.8 A. Difficulty of Voluntary Restructuring.9 B. Government Subsidy and Debt Recovery.10 C. State-Contingent Insurance Optimal Subsidy.10 D. Recapitalization with Common Equity.11 E. Recapitalization by Issuing Preferred Stock or Convertible Debts.12 F. Subsidized Debt Buybacks.14 G. Simple Asset Guarantees.15 H. Caballero s scheme.16 I. Above-Market-Price Asset Sales.16 J. The Sachs Proposal.18 K. Combining Several Schemes.18 IV. Private and Social Surplus from Restructuring.18 A. Key Concepts.19 B. Endogenous Surplus and Restructuring Design.20 V. Participation Issues under Asymmetric Information.23 A. Recapitalization with Asymmetric Information on Across-Bank Asset Quality.23 B. Asset Sales with within-Bank Adverse Selection Lemons Problem .26 C. Use of Government Information.27 1 We are deeply indebted to Olivier Blanchard and Stijn Claessens for numerous discussions. We would also like to thank Ricardo Caballero Giovanni Dell Ariccia Takeo Hoshi Takatoshi Ito Nobuhiro Kiyotaki Thomas Philippon Philipp Schnabl and many colleagues at the IMF for their helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF its Executive Board or its management. 2 VI. Other Considerations.27 A. Political Constraints.27 B. If Bankruptcy Is Inevitable.28 VII. Case Studies.29 A. Switzerland Good Bank Bad Bank Split in the Case of UBS.29 B. United Kingdom Recapitalization and Asset Guarantee for RBS and Lloyds-HBOS.31 C. United States The .