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The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 47

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 47. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 440 international law Plainly a non-central and precarious kind of law and legal system there seems no reason to doubt either its positivity as something added by human decision to natural morality or its obligatoriness in some measure in a world where no state can plausibly claim to be a fully complete community entitled to constitute the ultimate and unconditional horizon of a just person s allegiance. Developments in international law in recent decades have responded to a set of interrelated questions Has an individual person or a non-state group the right to move international organs as a subject of international law with substantive and procedural rights derived from international law Has an organization such as the United Nations an international personality comparable to that of a state and are its rights in international law limited to those conceded by the states party to its establishment Can the same be said of a non-governmental organization such as the International Red Cross If persons other than states can be subjects of international law rights can they also be creators of international law rules as states can When can individuals including rulers of states be tried by internationally authorized tribunals for offences against international law These questions like the tentative affirmative answers being given to them arise from a widespread understanding that new interdependencies economic environmental and cultural are bringing into being a world-wide human community which might in principle become a fully complete community governmentally equipped to supervise coercively the doing of justice everywhere but that no governmental authority can yet be envisaged such as could be relied upon to act with an effective justice sufficient to merit a general transfer or subordination of state jurisdiction to it. This last proposition reasonable though it doubtless is has the practical implication that international law will remain for the foreseeable future