tailieunhanh - Báo cáo khoa học: ""DONNELLAN'S DISTINCTION AND A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF REFERENCE"

In this paper, I describe how Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions should be represented in a computational model of reference. After briefly discussing the significance of Donnellan's distinction, I reinterpret it as being three-tiered, relating to object representation, referring intentions, and choice of rehrring expression. I then present a cognitive model of referring, the components of which correspond to this analysis, and discuss the interaction that takes place among those components. Finally, the implementation of this model, now in progress, is described. . | DONNELLAN S DISTINCTION AND A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF REFERENCE and . Amichai Kronfeld Artificial Intelligence Center Center for the study of SRI International 4 Language and Information 333 Ravenswood Avenue Stanford University Menlo Park CA 94025 Stanford CA 94305 kronfeld@sri-warbucks ABSTRACT In this paper I describe how Donnellan s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions should be represented in a computational model of reference. After briefly discussing the significance of Donnellan s distinction I reinterpret it as being three-tiered relating to object representation referring intentions and choice of referring expression. I then present a cognitive model of referring the components of which correspond to this analysis and discuss the interaction that takes place among those components. Finally the implementation of this model now in progress is described. INTRODUCTION It is widely acknowledged that Donnellan s distinction 7 between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions must be taken into account in any theory of reference. There is not yet agreement however as to where the distinction fits in a theoretical model of definite noun phrases. For Cohen 4 the intention that the hearer identify a referent constitutes a crucial difference between the referential and the attributive. Barwise and Perry 3 on the other hand treat their value-loaded value-free distinction as the central feature of the referential versus the attributive. However as pointed out by Grosz et al. 9 this analysis ignores an essential aspect of Donnellan s distinction namely the speaker s ability when using a description referentially to refer to an object that is independent of the semantic denotation. The problem of determining the correct interpretation of Donnellan s distinction is of considerable importance. First Donnellan s distinction seems to violate the principle that reference to physical objects is achieved by virtue of the