tailieunhanh - Performance effects of appointing other firms' executive directors to corporate boards: an analysis of UK firms

This paper has explored the impact of appointing executive directors as non- executive directors on the appointing firm‟s performance. We find that relatively few executive directors are appointed as non-executive directors in UK quoted firms, which is consistent with the Higgs Report (2003). This is despite the long-standing conjecture that such appointments may positively affect firm performance. Consistent with this view, our results suggest a positive link between the presence of an IED and the appointing firm‟s performance. Our data reveal that the better the relative performance of the firm where the director is an. | Performance effects of appointing other firms executive directors to corporate boards an analysis of UK firms Charlie Weir Robert Gordon University Garthdee Road Aberdeen AB10 7QE email Oleksandr Talavera Durham University Mill Hill Lane UK DH1 3LB email Alexander Muravyev St. Petersburg University Graduate School of Management Volkhovsky per. 3 St. Petersburg 199004 Russia and Institute for the Study of Labor IZA Schaumburg-LippeStr 5-9 Bonn53113 Germany email muravyev@ Standard disclaimer applies. Corresponding author Charlie Weir Robert Gordon University Garthdee Road Aberdeen AB10 7QE. Financial support for the project from the British Academy is gratefully acknowledged. 1 Performance effects of appointing other firms executive directors to corporate boards an analysis of UK firms. Abstract This paper studies the effect on company performance of appointing non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms. The analysis is based on a new panel dataset of UK companies over 2002-2008. Our results suggest a positive relationship between the presence of these non-executive directors and the accounting performance of the appointing companies. The effect is stronger if these directors are executive directors in firms that are performing well. We also find a positive effect where these non-executive directors are members of the audit committee. Overall our results are broadly consistent with the view that nonexecutive directors that are executives in other firms contribute to both the monitoring and advisory functions of corporate boards. JEL G34 G39 Key words executive directors non-executive directors company performance. 2 1 INTRODUCTION The conflict of interest between managers on the one hand and providers of finance most notably shareholders on the other is a key feature of the public corporation Shleifer and Vishny 1997 . Among various corporate governance mechanisms which aim to .

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