tailieunhanh - Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California

The idea of using markets and pricing computer re- sources is quite old. Pricing policies received consid- erable attention at the dawn of modern multi-user time sharing systems. Papers in the late 1960’s were dedi- cated to automated pricing policies for computer time [18, 19, 20]. As research, this work was short-lived. The complexity of these schemes relative to their benefit, combined with the environment of time-shared systems (mostly cooperative, mostly controlled by a single en- tity) quickly made pricing for shared resource allocation a low priority. Shared resource allocation remained a hot topic in operating systems, but the goal in this research was maximizing utilization through clever scheduling. In contrast, schedulers that. | Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California Joseph Lorenzo Hall1 2 Luke W. Miratrix3 Philip B. Stark3 Melvin Briones4 Elaine Ginnold4 Freddie Oakley5 Martin Peaden6 Gail Pellerin6 Tom Stanionis5 and Tricia Webber6 University of California Berkeley School of Information 2Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy 3University of California Berkeley Department of Statistics 4Marin County California Registrar of Voters 5Yolo County California County Clerk Recorder 6Santa Cruz County California County Clerk Abstract Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work 18 17 20 21 11 we report pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008 in three California counties one during the February 2008 Primary Election in Marin County and three during the November 2008 General Elections in Marin Santa Cruz and Yolo Counties. We explain what makes an audit risk-limiting and how existing and proposed laws fall short. We discuss the differences among our four pilot audits. We identify challenges to practical efficient risk-limiting audits and conclude that current approaches are too complex to be used routinely on a large scale. One important logistical bottleneck is the difficulty of exporting data from commercial election management systems in a format amenable to audit calculations. Finally we propose a bare-bones risk-limiting audit that is less efficient than these pilot audits but avoids many practical problems. 1 Introduction Nearly a decade after the 2000 presidential election fiasco the paper trail debate has all but ended More and more jurisdictions recognize that without indelible independent ballot records that reliably capture voter intent auditing election outcomes is impossible. As auditable voting systems are adopted more widely election researchers are studying how to audit elections efficiently in a .