tailieunhanh - Counterinsurgency - Principles And Practices In Viet-nam

Discussion of the criteria for measuring success in counterinsurgency. The author concludes that a Viet Cong military victory in South Vietnam is not possible as long as the United States in supporting the government. | COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN VIET-NAM James Farmer December 1964 P-3039 ỉ COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN VIET-NAM James Farmer The RAND Corporation Santa Monica California This paper discusses the criteria and indicators used for measuring success in counterinsurgency. Three phases of guerrilla warfare are described. It is concluded that a military victory is not possible for the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam as long as the . is supporting the government. . financial contribution is compared to . and French costs of the 1945-1954 Indo-China war and technical assistance and direct military support measures and their effects on the scarce resources--trained manpower communications transportation and government infrastructures--are described. The principles of Viet-Cong tactics are listed and illustrated. The paper suggests the problems of motivating the Vietnamese soldier to fight a war which he no longer feels will be won in the near future. Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff. This is an edited transcript of a presentation given to the combined classes of the Counterinsurgency Course of the Naval Reserve Officers School at Long Beach California on 25 November 1964. Some material has been added to the text to include subjects covered during the discussion period. Some sections of official interest only have been deleted for this form of publication. This is not a report of organized RAND research but rather is personal opinion and observations from field work in Viet-Nam previous work in counterinsurgency and limited war and continued association with American and Vietnamese soldiers and civilians participating in the on-going Vietnamese operation. The .