tailieunhanh - Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

Defining Critical Infrastructure: Nearly every organization is susceptible to a cyber attack. However, it is cost prohibitive to protect everything, and not every asset, even those within critical infrastructures, will have an impact on national security or critical functions. The government should work closely with each sector to identify elements of critical infrastructure that, if damaged or destroyed, could cause great loss of life or significant economic damage impacting our national security. Further, any targeted or limited regulation should only apply to critical functions or facilities rather than entire organizations to ensure that the impact is not. | Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile Karl Koscher Alexei Czeskis Franziska Roesner Shwetak Patel and Tadayoshi Kohno Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Washington Seattle Washington 98195-2350 Email supersat aczeskis franzi shwetak yoshi @ Stephen Checkoway Damon McCoy Brian Kantor Danny Anderson Hovav Shacham and Stefan Savage Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of California San Diego La Jolla California 92093-0404 Email s dlmccoy brian d8anders hovav savage @ Abstract Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit ECU can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments both in the lab and in road tests we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input including disabling the brakes selectively braking individual wheels on demand stopping the engine and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car such as maliciously bridging between our car s two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car s telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash. Looking forward we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while .