tailieunhanh - A Deeply Flawed Fuel Bank

Before signing on the dotted line, Airdrie Savings Bank needed to be reassured that Cortex would be compliant and that customer service wouldn’t be disrupted in any way (the last thing a bank that prides itself on personal service wants to do is reissue cards and PIN numbers). For FIS this meant adapting Cortex to handle some extremely strict compliance from the Payment Card Industry. Airdrie Savings Bank was looking for a long-term solution and, once FIS could show how compliance had been built into the system, they had no qualms in signing for 5 years. Once the criteria were. | ESSAY A Deeply Flawed Fuel Bank PROVIDING NATIONS WITH ENRICHED URANIUM WILL NOT PREVENT PROLIFERATION. IT WILL PROMOTE IT. AMITAI ETZIONI 2010 WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE There s a new and troubling idea afloat in the world of nuclear proliferation. To ensure that nations will not enrich uranium a key element in nuclear bomb production they will be provided with already-enriched uranium. Nations that already have significant enrichment capabilities including France Germany the Netherlands Russia the United Kingdom and the United States will provide the enriched uranium. To ensure the recipient nations are not dependent on the good will of any one nation countries will contribute to an inter national nuclear fuel bank regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency iaea or some other yet-to-be identified international entity from which recipient nations could obtain enriched uranium. Call it a fallback bank. WINTER 2010 2011 103 ESSAY The uranium provided will be low-enriched or LEU usually defined as enriched to 20 percent or less of the fissile isotope uranium-235 which is used for energy-related purposes rather than highly enriched uranium HEU usually defined as 90 percent enriched or more of uranium-235 which is used to make nuclear bombs. The fuel bank idea attempts to prevent recipient nations from further enriching the LEU to make bombs forcing them to give up their enrichment capabilities and submit to inspections preventing them from turning their LEU into HEU. In short nations will be able to build nuclear reactors and use them for peaceful purposes without enriching uranium and the world will rest assured that no nuclear proliferation is in the offing. The plan sounds good but as is often the case a great distance separates the lip and the cup. Two significant flaws exist one in its design and another in its implementation. Both pitfalls make it likely that outsourcing uranium enrichment will actually propel proliferation rather than slow it. CORRECTING A