tailieunhanh - The LDC Debt Crisis

The Bank Board also attempted to attract new capital to the industry, and it did so by liberalizing ownership restrictions for stock-held institutions in April 1982. That change proved to have a dramatic effect on the S&L industry. 22 Traditionally, federally chartered stock associations were required to have a minimum of 400 stockholders. No individual could own more than 10 percent of an institution s outstanding stock, and no controlling group more than 25 percent. Moreover, 75 percent of stockholders had to reside or do busi- ness in the S&L s market area. The elimination of these restrictions, coupled with the re- laxed capital requirements and the ability to acquire. | Chapter 5 The LDC Debt Crisis Introduction The spark that ignited the LDC less-developed-country debt crisis can be readily identified as Mexico s inability to service its outstanding debt to . commercial banks and other creditors. The crisis began on August 12 1982 when Mexico s minister of finance informed the Federal Reserve chairman the secretary of the treasury and the International Monetary Fund IMF managing director that Mexico would be unable to meet its August 16 obligation to service an 80 billion debt mainly dollar denominated . The situation continued to worsen and by October 1983 27 countries owing 239 billion had rescheduled their debts to banks or were in the process of doing so. Others would soon follow. Sixteen of the nations were from Latin America and the four largest Mexico Brazil Venezuela and Argentina owed various commercial banks 176 billion or approximately 74 percent of the total LDC debt Of that amount roughly 37 billion was owed to the eight largest . banks and constituted approximately 147 percent of their capital and reserves at the As a consequence several of the world s largest banks faced the prospect of major loan defaults and failure. This chapter provides a survey of the LDC debt crisis for the years 1973-89. The discussion covers the crisis year of 1982 as well as two periods that preceded it and one that followed. The opening sections examine the first two periods 1973-78 and 1979-82 enabling us to gain some understanding of the economic conditions and prevailing psychology that not only generated increased LDC borrowing but also produced overlending by the banks. The role bank regulators played during the years leading up to the outbreak of the crisis is also explored as are contemporary opinions on the LDC situation. The final section of the chapter discusses the post-1982 crisis years that consumed bank regulatory officials and the international banks with damage-control activity including .