tailieunhanh - WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 398 / OCTOBER 2004: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND BANK PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC SIMILARITIES

Regarding banks’ capital structures, the standard view is that capital regulation constitutes an additional, overriding departure from the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (see for example Berger et al., 1995, Miller, 1995, or Santos, 2001). Commercial banks have deposits that are insured to protect depositors and to ensure financial stability. In order to mitigate the moral-hazard of this insurance, commercial banks must be required to hold a minimum amount of capital. Our sample consists of large, systemically relevant commercial banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance during a period in which the uniform capital regulation of Basle I is in. | EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK NO. 398 I 2004 WORKING PAPER SERIES by Yener Altunbas and David Marqués Ibanez MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND BANK PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC SIMILARITIES EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 398 I OCTOBER 2004 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND BANK PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC SIMILARITIES1 10 by Yener Altunbas 2 and David Marqués Ibanez3 In 2004 all publications will carry a motif taken from the 100 banknote. This paper can be downloaded without charge from http or from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at http abstract_id 587265. I The opinions expressed in this paper are only those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the paper was completed while the first author was visiting the European Central Bank as part of its research visitor are very grateful for useful comments from an anonymous referee as well as from Jesper Berg John Fell Hans-Joachim Klockers Andrés Manzanares Phil Molyneux Rudy Vander Vennet Jukka Vesala and Peter would also like to thank Cornell s Brijde and Jean Paul Genot for their help in pointing us towards the right sources of information. 2 Centre for Banking and Financial Studies SBARD University of Wales Bangor Gwynedd Bangor LL57 2DG United Kingdom e-mail 3 Corresponding author. European Central Bank Kaiserstrasse 29 D-603II Frankfurt am Main Germany e-mail European Central Bank 2004 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone 49 69 1344 0 Internet http Fax 49 69 1344 6000 Telex 411 144 ecb d All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and noncommercialpurposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. The statement of purpose