tailieunhanh - IMF Working Paper

In recent years many countries have made drastic changes to the architecture of financial supervision, and more countries are contemplating modifications. The current restructuring wave is making the supervisory landscape less uniform than in the past. In several countries the architecture still reflects the classic model, with separate agencies for banking, securities and insurance supervision. However, an increasing number of countries show a trend towards consolidation of supervisory powers, which in some cases has culminated in the establishment of a unified regulator, either inside or outside the central bank | Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand Supervisory Architecture Financial Structure and Market View Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 2008 International Monetary Fund WP 08 47 IMF Working Paper IMF Institute Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand Supervisory Architecture Financial Structure and Market View Prepared by Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn 1 Authorized for distribution by Andrew Feltenstein February 2008 Abstract This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author s and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author s and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First an empirical test of two theories the helping and the grabbing hand view of government seems more consistent with the latter presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators. JEL Classification Numbers G18 G28 E58 Keywords Financial supervision political economy grabbing hand banking concentration Author s E-Mail Address mquintyn@ 1 Donato Masciandaro is full professor Paulo Baffi Centre Bocconi University Milan Italy. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second European Conference on Financial Regulation and Supervision-Finance Law and Data June 18-19 2007 at Bocconi University Milan. The authors would like