tailieunhanh - DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in ransferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions

Overall, our proposed framework is quite general and is applicable to investment decisions in real time. For one, moments used to form optimal portfolios obey closed-form expressions. This facilitates the implementation of formal trading strategies across a large universe of mutual funds. In addition, our strategies employ long-only positions in mutual funds, which implies long-only positions in the underlying stocks (since almost no mutual funds short-sell stocks)—thus, our models derive performance from strategies that could potentially be implemented by investing in mutual funds or in their underlying stock choices | A EUROPEAN COMMISSION Strasbourg COM 2012 350 final 2012 0168 COD Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2009 65 EC on the coordination of laws regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities UCITS as regards depositary functions remuneration policies and sanctions Text with EEA relevance SWD 2012 185 final sWd 2012 186 final EN EN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1. Context of the proposal . General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985 the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall in accordance with national law be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive apart from employing a negligence-based standard makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary s duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result different approaches have developed across the European Union leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy1 and the Madoff fraud. In particular the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff the US broker