tailieunhanh - Team Management and Mutual Funds

Government incentives and guarantees can then also be used – from support for research and development (R&D) - which affects operational efficiency- to investment incentives (capital grants, loan guarantees and low-interest rate loans), taxes (accelerated depreciation, tax credits, tax exemptions and rebates), and price-based policies at the output stage (which affect revenue streams - . feed-in tariffs), or policies which target the cost of investment in capital by hedging or mitigating risk. These incentives and mechanisms are not specific to pension fund investment but aim to improve the general policy framework for green investment. | CFR-working Paper NO. 05-10 Team Management and Mutual Funds M. Bar A. Kempf S. Ruenzi centre for Financial Research Look deeper m 1 It à 1 1 It J 1 1-1 1 Team Management and Mutual Funds Michaela Bar baer@ graduiertenkolleg Alexander Kempf kempf@ finanzierung Stefan Ruenzi ruenzi@ finanzierung September 2005 Keywords Mutual Funds Team Management Performance Risk-Taking Invest- ment Style Fund Flows JEL-Classification G23 M54 We thank Vikas Agarwal Jason Greene Jayant Kale Ajay Khorana Jerry Parwada Laura Starks Sheridan Titman and seminar participants at Stanford University Georgia State University University of Texas at Austin University of Massachusetts at Amherst and the CFR Cologne Research Seminar for helpful comments and suggestions. Bar is at the Graduate School of Risk Management at the University of Cologne Albertus Magnus Platz 50923 Koeln Germany Kempf and Ruenzi are at the Department of Finance University of Cologne Albertus-Magnus Platz 50923 Koeln Germany. Bar gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation DGF . All authors are members of the Centre for Financial Research CFR Cologne. All errors are our own. Abstract In recent years team management has become increasingly popular in the mutual fund industry. In this paper we analyze team management along three broad dimensions. First we examine potential determinants explaining a fund s management structure. Second we analyze potential effects of fund management structure on managerial behavior. Third we address the consequences of team management on fund performance performance persistence and fund inflows. Findings show that the management choice is a strategic decision made usually uniformly for all funds at the fund family level. In particular the extent and complexity of the tasks fund managers face determine management structure with more teams in .