tailieunhanh - Taking Stock: Community Policing in Chicago

Second, managers can affect the volatility of firm’s equity. Risk-averse managers who are compensated in traditional ways (salary, bonus and stock) have incentive to keep the volatility of the firm low when they hold a large fraction of their human capital and their financial wealth in the firm. Such managers have incentives to turn down risk-increasing, positive NPV projects if the negative effect on their expected utility of an increase in total firm risk is larger than the positive effect of an increase in firm value. Highly undiversified, risk-averse managers will require increases in firm value to compensate them for increases in systematic. | . Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice . Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street . Washington DC 20531 John Ashcroft Attorney General Deborah J. Daniels Assistant Attorney General Sarah V. Hart Director National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs World Wide Web Site http www . National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site http www . nij Cover photographs copyright 1998 Digitalstock and background photo 1994 PhotoDisc Inc. Taking Stock Community Poicing in Chicago Wesley G. Skogan Lynn Steiner Jill DuBois J. Erik Gudell and Aimee Fagan Institute for Policy Research Northwestern University July 2002 NCJ .