tailieunhanh - Cyberspace policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure

Some DoS attacks can be avoided by applying vendor patches to affected software. For example, many vendors have patched their IP implementations to prevent intruders from taking advantage of the IP reassembly bugs. A few DoS attacks cannot be stopped, but their scope of affected areas can be constrained. TCP SYN flooding attack effects can be reduced or eliminated by limiting the number of TCP connections a system accepts and by shortening the amount of time a connection stays half open (that is, the time during which the TCP three-way handshake has been initiated but not completed). Typically, limiting the number. | CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure Preface Cyberspace touches practically everything and everyone. It provides a platform for innovation and prosperity and the means to improve general welfare around the globe. But with the broad reach of a loose and lightly regulated digital infrastructure great risks threaten nations private enterprises and individual rights. The government has a responsibility to address these strategic vulnerabilities to ensure that the United States and its citizens together with the larger community of nations can realize the full potential of the information technology revolution. The architecture of the Nation s digital infrastructure based largely upon the Internet is not secure or resilient. Without major advances in the security of these systems or significant change in how they are constructed or operated it is doubtful that the United States can protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations. Our digital infrastructure has already suffered intrusions that have allowed criminals to steal hundreds of millions of dollars and nation-states and other entities to steal intellectual property and sensitive military information. Other intrusions threaten to damage portions of our critical infrastructure. These and other risks have the potential to undermine the Nation s confidence in the information systems that underlie our economic and national security interests. The Federal government is not organized to address this growing problem effectively now or in the future. Responsibilities for cybersecurity are distributed across a wide array of federal departments and agencies many with overlapping authorities and none with sufficient decision authority to direct actions that deal with often conflicting issues in a consistent way. The government needs to integrate competing interests to derive a holistic vision and plan to .