tailieunhanh - Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest

Embedded derivatives are simply derivatives embedded in a host contract. Therefore, the measurement rules for embedded derivatives which are required to be separated are the same as those applicable to stand alone derivatives in IAS 39. If the embedded derivative is separated from the host contract then the embedded derivative shall be valued at fair value and the changes in the fair value recognised in profit or loss. In terms of IAS 39, if an entity is unable to separately measure the fair value of an embedded derivative requiring separation from the host contract, the whole contract shall be measured at fair value with the changes in fair. | Accountability in Accounting The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest WALTER MATTLI and TIM BUTHE Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent s action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal-agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent s financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further the article posits that exogenous changes in the macropolitical climate can deeply affect the nature of principal-agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals. DELEGATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE ACTORS Why do governments delegate public authority to private actors and what are the consequences The phenomenon of delegation to private actors has so far been largely overlooked by the social science literature on delegation which focuses predominantly on delegation from legislatures to public The existing literature has examined such delegation mostly in the United States . Hammond and Knott McCubbins Noll and Weingast 1987 cf. also Moe 1985 but recently also comparatively across .

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