tailieunhanh - SUPPLY CHAIN GAMES: OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AND RISK VALUATION phần 2

• các điều khoản hợp chất có ý nghĩa rõ ràng từ ý nghĩa kết hợp của các bộ phận thành phần • các biến thể khi ý nghĩa của các biến thể rõ ràng từ thời hạn cơ bản (ví dụ, báo cáo ngoại lệ được bao gồm, ngoại trừ báo cáo là không). Như một kết quả trong nhóm, miễn trừ nêu trên, thuật ngữ này bao gồm: • | 44 1 SUPPLY CHAIN OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Dantzig developed the simplex algorithm in linear programming. A few years later a relationship between certain types of games explicitly zerosum games and their solution by linear programming was pointed out. Here we are concerned with two-persons zero-sum games. Situations where there may be more than one player potential coalitions cooperation asymmetry of information where one player may know something the other does not etc. are practically important but are not within our scope of study. Two-Persons Zero-Sum Games Two-persons zero-sum games involve two players. Each has only one move decision to take and both make their moves simultaneously. Each player has a set of alternatives say A A1 A2 A3 An for the first player and B B1 B2 B3 Bm for the second player. When both players make their moves . they select a decision alternative an outcome Ojj follows corresponding to the pair of moves Ai Bj which was selected by each of the players respectively. In two-persons zero-sum games additional assumptions are made 1 A1 A2 A3 An as well as B1 B2 B3 Bm and Oj are known to both players. 2 Players do not know with what probabilities the opponent s alternatives will be selected. 3 Each player has a preference that can be ordered in a rational and consistent manner. In strictly competitive games or zero-sum games the players have directly opposing preferences so that a gain by a player is a loss to its opponent. That is The Gain to Player 1 The Loss of Player 2 The concepts of pure and mixed strategies minimax and maximin strategies saddle points dominance etc. are also defined and elaborated. For example two rival companies A and B are the only ones. Company A has three alternatives A1 A2 A3 expressing different strategic while B has four alternatives B1 B2 B3 B4 . The payoff matrix to A a loss to B is given by APPENDIX ESSENTIALS OF GAME THEORY 45 B1 B2 B3 B4 A1 .6 A2 -7 .1 .9 .5 A3 0 .8 This problem has a .