tailieunhanh - Why Are there So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation phần 8

người ta có thể xây dựng các tuyên bố liên ngân hàng có năng suất tối ưu. Mặc dù tuyên bố liên ngân hàng không cần phải được đơn giản cao cấp, nợ không có bảo đảm yêu cầu bồi thường như trong ví dụ này, các tính năng chất lượng của nó tương tự như những ví dụ. | SYSTEMIC RISK INTERBANK RELATIONS AND LIQUIDITY PROVISION BY THE CENTRAL I Consider now the case of credit chains. Still assuming À 1 the balance sheet equations give Di 1 Ri Di 1 i 1 2 3. We can compute the losses experienced by each bank with respect to the promised returns R and it is a simple exercise to check that the only solution is D1 3R D3 5 R D2 6r. Therefore bank 1 is able to pass on a higher share of its losses than in the diversified lending case which explains the lower exposure of the interbank system to market discipline in the credit chain system. The results of this section highlight another side of interbank markets in addition to their role in redistributing liquidity efficiently as studied by Bhattacharya and Gale 1987 . Interbank connections enhance the resiliency of the system to withstand the insolvency of a particular bank. However this network of cross-liabilities may loosen market discipline and allow an insolvent bank to continue operating through the implicit subsidy generated by the interbank credit lines. This loosening of market discipline is the rationale for a more active role for monitoring and supervision with the regulatory agency having the right to close down a bank in spite of the absence of any liquidity crisis at that bank. The effect of a central bank s guarantee on interbank credit lines would be that x 1 . 1 is always an equilibrium even if one bank is insolvent. The stability of the banking system would be preserved at the cost of forbearance of inefficient banks. Closure-Triggered Contagion Risk Efficiency versus Contagion Risk We now turn to the other side of the relationship between efficiency and stability of the banking system and investigate under which conditions the closure at time t 1 of an insolvent bank does not trigger the liquidation of solvent banks in a contagion fashion. Suppose indeed that bank k is closed at t 1. Assumption implies that Xk 0 and Dk 0. Closing bank k at t 1 has .