tailieunhanh - THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE phần 4

nó sẽ có vẻ, theo tỷ lệ khi cô thành công trong việc đưa dưới ảnh hưởng hiệu quả của mình, thủy quân lục chiến thương gia của Scandinavia và của Hà Lan. (2) Đức đã nhượng lại cho các nước Đồng Minh (7 *) nhượng này không chỉ áp dụng đối với chủ quyền nhưng mở rộng điều kiện không thuận lợi đối với tài sản của chính phủ, | THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 40 and of an analogous provision relating to passenger traffic 58 will much depend on the interpretation of the phrase similar conditions of transport . 59 For the time being Germany s transport system will be much more seriously disordered by the provisions relating to the cession of rolling-stock. Under paragraph 7 of the armistice conditions Germany was called on to surrender 5 000 locomotives and 150 000 waggons in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings . Under the treaty Germany is required to confirm this surrender and to recognise the title of the Allies to the material. 60 She is further required in the case of railway systems in ceded territory to hand over these systems complete with their full complement of rolling-stock in a normal state of upkeep as shown in the last inventory before 11 November 1918. 61 That is to say ceded railway systems are not to bear any share in the general depletion and deterioration of the German rolling-stock as a whole. This is a loss which in course of time can doubtless be made good. But lack of lubricating oils and the prodigious wear and tear of the war not compensated by normal repairs had already reduced the German railway system to a low state of efficiency. The further heavy losses under the treaty will confirm this state of affairs for some time to come and are a substantial aggravation of the difficulties of the coal problem and of export industry generally. 3 There remain the clauses relating to the river system of Germany. These are largely unnecessary and are so little related to the supposed aims of the Allies that their purport is generally unknown. Yet they constitute an unprecedented interference with a country s domestic arrangements and are capable of being so operated as to take from Germany all effective control over her own transport system. In their present form they are incapable of justification but some simple changes might transform .