tailieunhanh - Ten Years aFTer: Revisiting the AsiAn FinAnciAl cRisis phần 5

và khấu hao của đồng ringgit của Malaysia sau khi Hiệp ước Plaza tháng 9 năm 1985. Những phá giá đã được kèm theo các yếu tố khác của tự do hóa tài chính trong nước và quốc cuộc khủng hoảng lớn cho Malaysia. Tuy nhiên, ông đã tìm thấy nó khó khăn | Ten Years After the Asian Crisis An Indonesian Insider s View Table 2. Impacts of the Crisis June 1997-March 1998 percent changes Indonesia South Korea Thailand Malaysia Nominal Exchange Rate -75 -41 -38 -33 Real Exchange Rate -63 -33 -27 -23 Nominal Interest Rate 32 12 8 GDP growth Stock Market in . dollars -50 -46 -58 -79 Stock Market in Indonesian rupiah -27 -38 -18 -38 Source Adapted from Table 5 Andrew Berg The Asian Crisis Causes Policy Responses Outcomes IMF Working Paper WP 99 138 Washington International Monetary Fund 1999 http external pubs ft wp 1999 . The decision to invite the IMF in early September 1997 was made with the aim of reinvigorating market and public confidence in the Indonesian management of the national economy. This is in recognition of the fact that the presence of multilateral financial institutions in Indonesia was expected to help revive market confidence. One of the key IMF recommendations for Indonesia was for the government to implement a comprehensive bank restructuring process which included the closures of insolvent banks. In fact the bank closure became a prior action program which served as a precondition for the IMF to agree on providing a stand-by loan. Unfortunately for Indonesia the bank closures did not just fail to bring back market confidence they actually instigated bank runs and brought the entire banking sector near total dissolution. The bank closures in conjunction with tightened monetary and fiscal policies turned 47 J. Soedradjad Djiwandono out to be tantamount to pushing the distressed banks into a full-fledged banking crisis. There have been many discussions on the merits and demerits of the Indonesian bank closures including regarding who exactly is to blame. In the debate of why the bank closures did not succeed different arguments have been raised. Many such as Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs in their 1998 paper argue that the bank closures failed because .