tailieunhanh - The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Part 83

The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Part 83. In the past decade, Cognitive Linguistics has developed into one of the most dynamic and attractive frameworks within theoretical and descriptive linguistics The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics is a major new reference that presents a comprehensive overview of the main theoretical concepts and descriptive/theoretical models of Cognitive Linguistics, and covers its various subfields, theoretical as well as applied. | 790 MICHEL ACHARD introduced by the three complementizers. It seems clear that no koto and to code some sort of scale relative to the directness with which the scene profiled in the complement clause is construed. However the structural difference between no and koto on the one hand and to on the other hand needs to be recognized. The contrast between no and koto has been expressed in different terms over the years. Kuno 1973 explains it in terms of a concrete-abstract distinction. Josephs 1976 analyzes it in terms of directness versus indirectness. More recently Horie 2000 argues that the semantic category coded by the no-koto contrast is most judiciously expressed in terms of event versus proposition. His account is certainly compatible with the earlier ones. The perception of an event is more direct and in that sense more concrete than the conception of a proposition an object of thought remote from the immediacy of perception. Horie s analysis explains why no can sometimes encode a proposition if the main verb is a cognitive one such as siru learn but koto does not usually code events as illustrated in 16 16 Mary-wa John-ga toori-o wataru koto-o mi-ta. street-Acc cross nr-acc see-pst Mary saw John cross the street. The distinction between the nominalizing no and koto and the nonnormalizing to has also been investigated. In Kuno 1973 it is expressed in terms of factivity-nonfactivity. Suzuki 1996 argues that no koto and to form a continuum in relation to the extent to which the speaker accepts the information presented to him or her. In later work however she claims that the structural difference between to and the nominalizing complementizers is best expressed in terms of Frajzyngier s 1991 terminology of de re versus de dicto. The entities coded by koto and no events or propositions belong to the domain of reality de re whereas the complements introduced by to belong to the domain of speech de dicto Suzuki 2000 34 . Suzuki claims that the .