tailieunhanh - foundations of international macroeconomics phần 9

Lý thuyết của các ràng buộc những người muốn có một đánh giá chi tiết về các khái niệm TOC áp dụng kế toán sẽ không muốn bỏ lỡ cuốn sách này. Người kinh doanh sẽ được hưởng lợi từ những hiểu biết về cách áp dụng TOC suy nghĩ định hướng | 637 Models of Credibility in Monetary Policy ơr - - z - Ấ 2 7T2 31 where Ttf Ei-ittt E iP - Pi-1. Clearly the model is ad hoc compared with the models considered in other chapters of this book. It nonetheless provides a useful if rough depiction of the typical tensions between monetary authorities and wage setters in many countries. The authorities would like output to be above its market-clearing level whereas each individual wage setter while perhaps agreeing with the general social goals of high aggregate employment and low inflation wishes to avoid being among those who work at unexpectedly low real We have assumed that the monetary authorities set actual inflation 7tt after the private sector sets nominal contracts which embody Ttf but does this fact mean that the authorities will always choose to set inflation high enough to force unemployment below the natural rate Perhaps surprisingly the answer is no. To see -why we need to consider how equilibrium is determined. Equilibrium in the One-Shot Game The presence of the wedge k between the target and natural output levels creates a dynamic consistency problem for the monetary authorities in the sense we used that term in Chapter 6 . The authorities would like to be able credibly to announce a zero-mean distribution of future inflation. But if such an announcement were believed by wage setters the monetary authorities would be in a position to raise output above its natural level through an inflationary surprise at very little cost. Absent a mechanism for enforcing a promise of zero average inflation a monetary authority whose promises are believed will never find 7T 0 optimal ex post. Though they move first the atomistic wage setters understand the loss function 31 that the monetary authorities will minimize in the following period. They realize that for given values of 7T e and Zt the first-order condition for the authorities found by differentiating eq. 31 with respect to 7T will be 7 7 2