tailieunhanh - Báo cáo hóa học: " Research Article Spectrum Allocation for Decentralized Transmission Strategies: Properties of Nash Equilibria"

Tuyển tập báo cáo các nghiên cứu khoa học quốc tế ngành hóa học dành cho các bạn yêu hóa học tham khảo đề tài: Research Article Spectrum Allocation for Decentralized Transmission Strategies: Properties of Nash Equilibria | Hindawi Publishing Corporation EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing Volume 2009 Article ID 354890 11 pages doi 2009 354890 Research Article Spectrum Allocation for Decentralized Transmission Strategies Properties of Nash Equilibria Peter von Wrycza 1 M. R. Bhavani Shankar 1 Mats Bengtsson 1 and Bjorn Ottersten EURASIP Member 1 2 1 Department of Electrical Engineering ACCESS Linnaeus Centre Signal Processing Laboratory Royal Institute of Technology KTH SE-100 44 Stockholm Sweden 2 Interdisciplinary Centre for Security Reliability and Trust University of Luxembourg Luxembourg 1511 Luxembourg Correspondence should be addressed to Peter von Wrycza Received 1 October 2008 Accepted 4 March 2009 Recommended by Holger Boche The interaction of two transmit-receive pairs coexisting in the same area and communicating using the same portion of the spectrum is analyzed from a game theoretic perspective. Each pair utilizes a decentralized iterative water-filling scheme to greedily maximize the individual rate. We study the dynamics of such a game and find properties of the resulting Nash equilibria. The region of achievable operating points is characterized for both low- and high-interference systems and the dependence on the various system parameters is explicitly shown. We derive the region of possible signal space partitioning for the iterative waterfilling scheme and show how the individual utility functions can be modified to alter its range. Utilizing global system knowledge we design a modified game encouraging better operating points in terms of sum rate compared to those obtained using the iterative water-filling algorithm and show how such a game can be imitated in a decentralized noncooperative setting. Although we restrict the analysis to a two player game analogous concepts can be used to design decentralized algorithms for scenarios with more players. The performance of the modified decentralized game is evaluated and