tailieunhanh - Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation

Different PHI functions give rise to specific policy challenges. Primary PHI markets often create access-related challenges, especially for high-risk and vulnerable groups, where they represent the sole form of cover for some population Where public and private delivery systems are linked to different funding sources, as in systems with duplicate private health insurance, differences in access to care, choice levels and utilisation patterns occur between individuals with and without private insurance. Providers’ and individuals’ incentives to consume health care are particularly affected in complementary PHI markets that provide coverage for cost sharing under public programmes. The moral hazard implications of these incentives need to be weighed. | Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability An Empirical Investigation by Asli Demirgũẹ-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache JEL Classification G28 G21 E44 Keywords Deposit insurance banking crises World Bank Development Research Group and International Monetary Fund Research Department. The findings interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank IMF their Executive Directors or the countries they represent. We wish to thank George Clark Roberta Gatti Francesca Recanatini Marco Sorge and Colin Xu for very helpful comments. We are greatly indebted to Anqing Shi and Tolga Sobac2 for excellent research assistance. - 2 - I. Introduction The first formal system of national bank deposit insurance was established in the . in 1934 with the purpose of preventing the extensive bank runs that contributed to the Great Depression. Other countries even those where bank distress had accompanied the depression did not follow this lead and it was not until the Post-War period that deposit insurance began to spread outside of the . Table I . The 1980 s saw an acceleration in the diffusion of deposit insurance with most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing countries adopting some form of explicit depositor protection. In 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the European Union. 1 More recently the IMF has endorsed a limited form of deposit insurance in its code of best practices Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren 1997 . Despite its increased favor among policy-makers the desirability of deposit insurance remains a matter of some controversy among economists. In the classic work of Diamond and Dybvig 1983 deposit insurance financed through money creation is an optimal policy in a model where bank stability is threatened by self-fulfilling depositor runs. If runs result from imperfect information on the part .

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