tailieunhanh - Experimental Business Research II springer 2005 phần 7

Nghiên cứu thực nghiệm kinh doanh. II H1: Nhân viên hợp đồng tiền thưởng hợp đồng hợp hình phạt kinh tế tương đương. Trước khi chúng tôi giải quyết những sự khác biệt dự kiến trong nỗ lực giữa tiền thưởng và các hợp đồng hình phạt, chúng tôi đầu tiên đưa ra giả thuyết hiệu ứng chung trong giả thuyết thứ hai và thứ ba của chúng ta mà chúng ta mong đợi để giữ cho cả hai hợp đồng tiền thưởng và hình phạt. . | 154 Experimental Business Research Vol. II H1 Employees prefer bonus contracts to economically equivalent penalty contracts. Before we address expected differences in effort between bonus and penalty contracts we first hypothesize general effects in our second and third hypotheses that we expect to hold for both bonus and penalty contracts. Our second hypothesis addresses the effect on effort of employees expected disappointment about having to pay a penalty or not receiving a bonus. We do not distinguish between bonus contracts and penalty contracts because disappointment is expected to affect effort regardless of whether the contract is framed as a bonus or as a penalty. Specifically we predict that employees who expect to feel more disappointed about the prospect of receiving lower compensation either by having to pay a penalty or by not receiving a bonus will expend more effort to avoid that outcome than employees who expect to feel less disappointed about receiving the lower final payment. This prediction is consistent with conventional economic theory which assumes that employees with greater incremental utilities for a higher monetary outcome . receiving the higher final payment without having to pay a penalty or forgo a bonus will expend more effort to ensure that they receive that outcome. Thus it follows that employees with a greater incremental utility for receiving a higher monetary outcome will experience a greater reduction in utility from not receiving that outcome. In our study expected disappointment about not receiving the bonus or having to pay the penalty corresponds to this reduction in utility from not receiving the higher final payment. H2 Greater expected disappointment will result in higher employee effort. Our third hypothesis relates to the effect of perceived fairness on effort. Many studies in psychology . Goranson and Berkowitz 1966 Greenberg and Frisch 1972 Greenberg 1978 and experimental economics . Kahneman Knetsch and .