tailieunhanh - Experimental Business Research II springer 2005 phần 6

Mỗi nước có thể có thể thay đổi giá cân bằng bằng cách tăng (hoặc giảm) số lượng cung cấp (hoặc yêu cầu). Nếu như vậy, và thặng dư của nước này theo mức giá cân bằng mới là lớn hơn so với thặng dư dưới mức giá cân bằng đúng. Sau đó, chúng tôi nói rằng | 124 Experimental Business Research Vol. II soft In our experiment identical pairs of 50 gift cards were auctioned simultaneously with one card of the pair auctioned with a soft close and the other auctioned with a hard close. We find that soft-close auctions yield higher revenue than hard-close auctions and this difference is statistically significant. Both types of auctions were equally likely to have a late bid . a bid submitted within the last five minutes of the auction. However our ability to detect differences in the frequency of late bidding is limited by the small sample size of our study. Our study is motivated in part by Roth and Ockenfels 2000 2002 comparison of last minute bidding also know as sniping on eBay and Amazon on auctions of computers and antiques. Roth and Ockenfels find that there is significantly more late bidding on eBay auctions than on Amazon auctions. In their data set more than two-thirds of the eBay auctions received a bid in the last 30 minutes of the auction and about 40 percent received bids in the last five minutes. In contrast on Amazon only about one quarter of the auctions received a bid in the last 30 minutes of the auction and only 3 percent received a bid in the last five minutes. This difference in the timing of bids is consistent with a theoretical analysis of hard and soft close auctions. One explanation for the difference stems from the fact that in practice there is some chance that an attempt to place a bid at the last minute of an auction will not be successful. When this is this case Roth and Ockenfels 2000 show that for auctions with a hard close there is an equilibrium in which all bidders submit a bid equal to their value at the last minute under some assumptions on the distribution of values . In this equilibrium the bidders tacitly collude - all the bidders respond to an early bid by bidding their values immediately. In equilibrium a bidder prefers to bid late and face a smaller number of competing .