tailieunhanh - Experimental Business Research II springer 2005 phần 4

Trong thí nghiệm bán đấu giá đôi của chúng tôi, chi phí cận biên giảm bớt hội tụ nhanh hơn trong thiết lập thương mại song phương. Chúng tôi phỏng đoán rằng điều này phát sinh vì nhiều nhất là một cặp trong bán đấu giá đôi có thể thương mại tại cùng một thời gian tối đa là ba cặp có thể làm như vậy theo thương mại song phương. | Choosing a Model out of Many Possible Alternatives 67 In our double auction experiment marginal abatement costs converged less rapidly than in the bilateral trading setting. We conjecture that this arises because at most one pair in the double auction can trade at the same time while at most three pairs can do so under bilateral trading. In order to understand how much market power a country has we need an aggregate excess demand curve of all the subjects regarding the marginal abatement cost curves as the excess demand curves for emissions allowances. In our design the competitive equilibrium price range is from 118 to 120 while the excess demand for permits is zero under this price range. Each country might be able to change the equilibrium price by increasing or decreasing the quantity supplied or demanded . If so and the surplus of this country under the new equilibrium price is greater than the surplus under the true equilibrium price. Then we say that the country has market power. After careful examination we find that the only country that has market power in our design is the US. Table 3 shows that the benefits of the US were more than three times larger than the benefit at the competitive equilibrium in two out of eight sessions under bilateral trading. A statistical test shows that the US did not exercise its market power in any session. Most probably the subjects could not exploit the marginal abatement cost curve information to use their market power. Under double auction the individual efficiency of the US is statistically greater than one. It is remarkable to find that high efficiency was observed even when there existed a subject who had market power. What would happen if subjects could easily find out that they have some market power and the transaction is done by double auction Bohm 2000 found that the efficiency in this setting is still high but the distribution of the surplus is distorted. That is it is often said that the efficiency of the .

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