tailieunhanh - Bargaining and Markets - Martin J. Osborne

The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash’s work in the early 1950s. In this book we discuss two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. We do not attempt to survey the field. Rather, we select a small number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. We take the approach that a thorough analysis of a few models is more rewarding than short discussions of many models. Some of our selections are arbitrary and. | Reprinted from Bargaining and Markets ISBN 0-12-528632-5 Copyright 1990 with permission from Elsevier. References updated and errors corrected. Version 2005-3-2. Bargaining and Markets This is a volume in ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMETRICS AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS A series of Monographs and Textbooks Consulting Editor Karl Shell Cornell University A list of recent titles in this series appears at the end of this volume. Bargaining and Markets Martin J. Osborne Department of Economics McMaster University Hamilton Ontario Canada http osborne Ariel Rubinstein Department of Economics Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv Israel http ACADEMIC PRESS INC. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers San Diego New York Boston London Sydney Tokyo .