tailieunhanh - Masters of Illusion American Leadership in the Media Age Phần 6

Vortexes của Danger Trong khi đó, và quan trọng không kém, chính phủ Mỹ sẽ phải quyết định làm thế nào để đáp ứng với kho vũ khí tên lửa đạn đạo ngày càng tăng của Trung Quốc. | 256 Vortexes of Danger Meanwhile and equally important the American government is going to have to decide how to respond to China s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. In the 1960s when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced such a decision the Soviet Union s ballistic missiles were a unique and unprecedented threat to the United States. Even today only Russian missiles present a similar threat. China however may soon acquire a similar strategic nuclear capability and we are going to have to decide what to do about it. Most of us thought the risk of global nuclear war had disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Of course we recognized the risk of nuclear terrorism but we thought that global nuclear war could never happen because the United States is and seems likely to remain the world s only conventional military superpower. Will we confront more Able Archers in the future Will other American presidents be confronted with nuclear brinksmanship over Taiwan or the collateral risks of nuclear exchange stemming from hostilities among other nuclear states Unfortunately the answer most likely is yes. The reality is that the end of the Cold War has not ended the risk of nuclear war and that what was at one time a snake with one head is now a hydraheaded monster. We had planned at first for a general reduction in the risk of nuclear war but this hasn t happened and we are now attempting to rely on the old methods of balance of forces and mutual assured destruction. But there is no possible balance among the many nations now building nuclear strength and there is no formula like MAD on which we can rely to avoid war - though our leaders may wish to try. In today s situation we can only strive unceasingly to eliminate nuclear weapons while trying to protect ourselves if arms control falls apart. Both courses involve significant and considerable risk. We could find ourselves eliminating our own nuclear arsenals on the promise that others will do the same when in fact our