tailieunhanh - RATIONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE Part 2

Chúng tôi liên quan chỉ đơn thuần là Anna hành động như thể cô đã probabilistically tinh vi và tối đa hóa tiện ích dự kiến , để chúng ta có thể áp dụng máy móc các số liệu thống kê Bayesian để ra quyết định năng động của Anna? Hay đúng hơn, là mục tiêu của chúng tôi để xác định niềm tin của mình? | 50 SIMON GRANT AND TIMOTHY VAN ZANDT Identification of beliefs is not needed for Bayesian decision-making Are we concerned merely that Anna act as if she were probabilistically sophisticated and maximized expected utility so that we can apply the machinery of Bayesian statistics to Anna s dynamic decision-making Or rather is our objective to uniquely identify her beliefs The latter might be useful if we wanted to measure beliefs from empirically observed choices in one decision problem in order to draw conclusions about how Anna would act with respect to another decision problem. Otherwise the former is typically all we need and state-dependent preferences are sufficient. We can pick an additive representation of the form 11 with any weights V. Suppose that Anna faces a dynamic decision problem in which she can revise her choices at various decision nodes after learning some information represented by a partition of the set of states . Given dynamic consistency she will make the same decisions whether she makes a plan that she must adhere to or instead revises her decisions conditional on her information at each decision node. Furthermore in the latter case her preferences over continuation plans will be given by expected utility maximization with the same state-dependent utilities and with weights beliefs that are revised by Bayesian updating. This may allow the analyst to solve her problem by backward induction dynamic programming or recursion thereby decomposing a complicated optimization problem into multiple simpler problems. Yet state independence is a powerful restriction The real power of state-independent utility comes from the structure and restrictions that this imposes on preferences particularly in equilibrium models with multiple decision-makers. We already discussed this in the context of an intertemporal model with cardinally uniform utility. Let s revisit this point in the context of decision-making under uncertainty. With .