tailieunhanh - Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

TheMIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects the continuing interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biolo- gists, anthropologists, mathematicians, philosophers, and others, with a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary boundaries havemelted reject the outmoded notion thatwhat happens away from equilibrium can safelly be ignored, but think it no longer adequate to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and spontaneous order. We believe the time has come to put some beef on the table | Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games ROSS CRESSMAN Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Economic Learning and Social Evolution General Editor Ken Binmore Director of the Economic Learning and Social Evolution Centre University College London. 1. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection Larry Samuelson 1997 2. The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine 1998 3. Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 2 Just Playing Ken Binmore 1998 4. Social Dynamics Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young editors 2001 5. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Ross Cressman .

• Toán học
• Biology versus Economics
• Selection Dynamics
• Game Dynamics
• Three Strategy Games
• Fictitious Play
• The Replicator Dynamic