tailieunhanh - GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION

Dynamic Games are mathematical models of the interaction between different agents who are controlling a dynamical system. Such situations occur in many instances like armed conflicts (. duel between a bomber and a jet fighter), economic competition (. investments in R&D for computer companies), parlor games (Chess, Bridge). These examples concern dynamical systems since the actions of the agents (also called players) influence the evolution over time of the state of a system (position and velocity of aircraft, capital of know-how for Hi-Tech firms, positions of remaining pieces on a chess board, etc). The difficulty in deciding what should be the behavior of these agents stems from the. | GAMES AND INFORMATION FOURTH EDITION An Introduction to Game Theory Eric Rasmusen Basil Blackwell v Contents1 starred sections are less important List of Figures List of Tables Preface Contents and Purpose Changes in the Second Edition Changes in the Third Edition Using the Book The Level of Mathematics Other Books Contact Information Acknowledgements Introduction History Game Theory s Method Exemplifying Theory This Book s Style Notes PART 1 GAME THEORY 1 The Rules of the Game Definitions Dominant Strategies The Prisoner s Dilemma Iterated Dominance The Battle of the Bismarck Sea Nash Equilibrium Boxed Pigs The Battle of the Sexes and Ranked Coordination Focal Points Notes Problems 1 xxx February 2 2000. December 12 2003. 24 March 2005. Eric Rasmusen Erasmuse@. http GI Footnotes starting with xxx are the author s notes to himself. Comments are welcomed. Vi 2 Information The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game Information Sets Perfect Certain Symmetric and Complete Information The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games Example The Png Settlement Game Notes Problems 3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies Mixed Strategies The Welfare Game Chicken The War of Attrition and Correlated Strategies Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players The Civic Duty Game Different Uses of Mixing and Randomizing Minimax and the Auditing Game Continuous Strategies The Cournot Game Continuous Strategies The Bertrand Game Strategic Complements and Strategic Subsitutes Existence of Equilibrium Notes Problems 4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information Subgame Perfectness An Example of Perfectness Entry Deterrence I Credible Threats Sunk Costs and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames Pareto Perfection Notes Problems 5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information Finitely Repeated