tailieunhanh - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 87

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 87. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 840 scepticism claims to knowledge he continued I should like to say that Moore does not know what he says he knows but it stands fast for him as also for me regarding it as absolutely solid is part ofour method of inquiry . My certainty that I have a hand is proof against sceptical arguments and it is one of a heterogeneous group of certainties that form the background to all my ways of forming hypotheses challenging claims and conducting inquiries. Describing them as known blinds us to the distinctive role occupied by these certainties which provide the scaffolding for our inquiries. When the giving of grounds comes to an end he urges it is not in a kind of seeing on our part it is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language game para. 204 . These certainties are manifested in the ways in which we react to evidence and to hypotheses in our activities and our instinctive responses to the world. They are not expressed in conscious assent to propositions or in the search for evidence to support them. Local challenges are met by relying upon this scaffolding to guide our responses since the scaffolding is not presented as knowledge challenges to it cannot be posed or understood. Whether this provides a perspective from which we can resist the traditional philosophical obsession with scepticism may still be an open question. Our best hope for doing so may well be to argue with Wittgenstein that the scaffolding which guides us in forming and questioning beliefs cannot itself be questioned. But whether this suggestion will carry conviction for those who feel vividly the force of traditional sceptical arguments must remain uncertain. . knowledge limits of fallibilism Pyrrhonism founda-tionalism. D. Davidson A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge in E. Lepore ed. Truth and Interpretation Oxford 1986 . K. DeRose and T. Warfield eds. Skepticism A Contemporary Reader New York 1999 . C. J. Hookway Scepticism London 1990 . M. McGinn Sense and Certainty