tailieunhanh - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 78

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 78. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 750 pragmatism invention rather than a revelation. With James the ten-ability of a thesis is determined in terms of its experiential consequences in a far wider than merely observational sense a sense that embraces the affective sector as well. John Dewey like Peirce before him saw inquiry as a self-corrective process whose procedures and norms must be evaluated and revised in the light of subsequent experience. But Dewey regarded this reworking as a social and communal process proceeding in the light of values that are not as with Peirce connected specifically to science viz. prediction and experimental control but rather values that are more broadly rooted in the psychic disposition of ordinary people at large the moral and aesthetic dimension now being specifically included. Peirce s pragmatism is scientifically elitist James s is psychologically personalistic Dewey s is democratically populist. Pragmatism had a mixed reception in Europe. In Italy Giovanni Papini and Giovanni Vailati espoused the doctrine and turned it into a party platform for Italian philosophers of science. In Britain F. C. S. Schiller was an enthusiastic follower of William James while F. P. Ramsey and . Ayer endorsed pivotal aspects of Peirce s thought. Among continental participants Rudolf Carnap also put pragmatic ideas to work on issues oflogic and philosophy of language and Hans Reichenbach reinforced Peirce s statistical and probabilistic approach to the methodology of induction. However the reception of pragmatism by other philosophers was by no means universally favourable. F. H. Bradley objected to the subordination of cognition to practice because of the inherent incompleteness of all merely practical interests. G. E. Moore criticized William James s identification of true beliefs with useful ones among other reasons because utility is changeable over time. Bertrand Russell objected that beliefs can be useful but yet plainly false. And various continental philosophers have .