tailieunhanh - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 25

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 25. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 220 double truth encounter between the rationalism of Greek philosophy and the theology of omnipotence and inscrutability in Islam and was associated with Averroes who in his Decisive Treatise tried to justify a double standard of truth for the masses and truth for the philosopher. This earned him the ire of Islamic and Christian theologians and led to the Paris Condemnations of Bishop Tempier of 1270 and 1277 in which Boethius was centrally involved and to the attempts of St Thomas Aquinas to produce a coherent synthesis of pagan philosophy and Christian theology. The moral and intellectual privilege of the philosopher is a prominent theme in Spinoza Ethics proposition 41 Scholium . . subjective truth. G. F. Hourani Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy London 1961 . doubt. When we doubt a proposition we neither believe nor disbelieve it rather we suspend judgement regarding it as an open question whether it is true. Doubt can thus be a sceptical attitude one form of scepticism holds that any cognitive attitude other than doubt is irrational or illegitimate rationality requires a general suspension of judgement. The arguments employed by sceptics for example Pyrrhonists such as Sextus Empiricus are thus designed to induce doubt to shake our beliefs and certainties and to force us to suspend judgement. Descartes made doubt the cornerstone of a philosophical method in order to place our knowledge on foundations which are genuinely secure we should try to doubt all of our beliefs retaining them only if they are absolutely indubitable. Ordinary empirical beliefs are threatened by the possibility that I am dreaming as are even logical principles because I might be deceived by an evil demon. Unless I can eliminate these possibilities I cannot escape the suspicion that all my beliefs are infected by unnoticed error. Few have been convinced by Descartes s claims about when doubt is impossible and many have questioned his claims about the desirability of .