tailieunhanh - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 23

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 23. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 200 deontic logic logic is characterized by an interpretation according to which A is true at w exactly when A is true in all worlds deontically accessible from w . all worlds in which all the obligations of w are fulfilled. Much of the contemporary work in deontic logic has been inspired by the deontic paradoxes a collection of puzzle cases that have seemed to highlight deficiencies in the standard system. For example according to a version of Chisholm s paradox the following clauses should be mutually independent and jointly consistent Dr Jones ought to administer anaesthesia if she operates she ought not to if she doesn t she has an obligation to operate which she fails to meet. But attempts to represent these sentences within the standard system yield inconsistencies or redundancies. According to a version of the good Samaritan paradox Smith s repenting of a murder logically implies his committing the murder but his obligation to repent does not imply his obligation to have committed it. Yet in the standard system the provability ofA B implies the provability of nA OB. One reaction to examples like these has been to take sentences like Jones should administer anaesthesia if she operates as exemplifying an irreducibly dyadic relation of conditional obligation. A is obligatory given B has been interpreted for example as saying that B is true in the best of the worlds in which A is. Another reaction has been to eschew the operator It is obligatory that . . . which attaches to sentences in favour of a predicate of obligation which attaches only to names of actions. This approach eliminates altogether awkward formulae like nA DDA though it also risks eliminating formulae like nA A which have been thought to express important truths. It raises interesting questions about the nature of combined actions like a or b and about the relations between general deontic statements Smoking is prohibited and their instances Smith s smoking here now is prohibited . In recent .