tailieunhanh - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 18

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 18. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy. | 150 common sense though it has certain strengths makes it difficult to address such important questions as whether common sense is itself implicitly theoretical and whether or to what degree it is changeable. Without answering these questions we may none the less make headway by sketching the rough location of common sense in the landscape of philosophical inquiry. It is clear that the creative intellect needs some constraints other than logic since the conclusions ofmetaphys-ical thought need tests of acceptability other than consistency and sheer intellectual intuition is unlikely to provide enough. Moreover in spite of the excitement of esoteric theory philosophers have always hoped that their thinking had important connections with ordinary life and theories that entirely flout common sense tend to forfeit such connections. There is a sort of bad faith involved in acknowledging and living by certain beliefs in day-to-day life and denying these beliefs in the study. Even so extravagant an advocate of bewildering idealism as Bishop Berkeley claimed to be speaking on behalf of the vulgar. Thomas Reid a staunch apostle of a strong role for common sense in philosophy treated the invocation of common sense as ultimately an appeal to certain innate principles of human nature that are partly constitutive of what it is to reason. Reid used his understanding of common sense to attack various sceptical or reductionist views in metaphysics and morality. But he does not rely solely upon appeal to self-evidence or general consensus since it is an important part of his argument that those who ignore the commonsense principles in building their metaphysics find their reductive constructions built upon sand. It can he thinks be shown that Hume s metaphysics rests upon his theory of ideas and this theory is not only incompatible with the cognitive practices of ordinary people but makes it impossible for Hume to reach conclusions that his own position requires. Descartes said .