tailieunhanh - Optimal decision problem in a three-level closed-loop supply chain with risk-averse players under demand uncertainty

In this paper, a stochastic model of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one risk-averse manufacturer, one risk-averse retailer and one risk-averse third party is developed. | Optimal decision problem in a three-level closed-loop supply chain with risk-averse players under demand uncertainty Uncertain Supply Chain Management 7 2019 351 368 Contents lists available at GrowingScience Uncertain Supply Chain Management homepage uscm Optimal decision problem in a three-level closed-loop supply chain with risk-averse players under demand uncertainty Safoura Famil Alamdara Masoud Rabbania and Jafar Heydaria a School of Industrial Engineering College of Engineering University of Tehran Tehran Iran CHRONICLE ABSTRACT Article history In this paper a stochastic model of a closed-loop supply chain CLSC with one risk-averse Received May 16 2018 manufacturer one risk-averse retailer and one risk-averse third party is developed. To analyze Accepted July 16 2018 how the members make decisions about wholesale price collection rate retail price and sales Available online effort under different decision-making structures the optimal decision problem under July 17 2018 Keywords uncertain price and sales effort-dependent demand is studied through development of four Closed-loop supply chains game theoretical models. The equilibrium results between various models are compared and Risk-averse the optimal decisions from each member s perspective are investigated. According to the Collection effort results the third party-led model has better performance than manufacturer-led model. The Sales effort cooperation mode of manufacturer and retailer is beneficial for the whole chain and customers Game theory and the cooperation mode of manufacturer and third party is the most effective model to collect Coordination contract the used-product. Finally to increase the performance of decentralized CLSC compared with the centralized CLSC a coordination contract is developed. The results indicate that this contract is advantageous for the members of CLSC the customers and the environmental issues. 2018 by the authors licensee Growing Science Canada