tailieunhanh - Aviation with the human factor: Part 2

Continued from part 1, part 2 of the document Aviation with the human factor present the content: understanding and analyzing human error in real-world operations; cognitive architectures for human factors in aviation; aircrew fatigue, sleep need and circadian rhythmicity; human factors in aircraft design; aviation displays; cockpit automation: still struggling to catch up; unmanned aircraft systems; crew station design and integration; vehicles and systems; the history in the basics and the challenges for the future; general aviation; air traffi c management; maintenance human factors: a brief history; nextgen commentary; commentary on nextgen and aviation human factors. | CHAPTER 11 Understanding and Analyzing Human Error in Real-World Operations R. Key Dismukes Chief Scientist for Human Factors NASA Ames Research Center Mail Stop 262-2 Moffett Field CA Giant Airways 123 cleared for takeoff runway 25R. With that clearance the captain of flight 123 taxies into position on the runway as the first officer completes final preparation for takeoff. Both pilots are highly experienced in their large jet carrying nearly 300 passengers and between them have over 20 000 hours of flying for major airlines. The captain advances the throttles for takeoff and the aircraft begins to roll forward normally but the pilots are startled by a loud insistent warning horn. In their surprise it takes a moment for the pilots to comprehend what is happening but then they both recognize that the configuration warning system is telling them that something about the aircraft is not properly set and the captain retards the throttles while the aircraft is still moving slowly. The first officer radios the control tower that they have rejected the takeoff and the controller instructs them to taxi off the runway at the first turnoff. Scanning the cockpit as they taxi the pilots discover that the warning horn sounded because the flaps were not set to the proper takeoff position. Somehow the crew forgot to set the flaps and overlooked the omission when they ran Human Factors in Aviation 2nd ed. 335 2010 Elsevier Inc. 336 11. UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYZING HUMAN ERROR IN REAL-WORLD OPERATIONS the taxi checklist which directed them to verify the flap setting in spite of having set flaps and run checklists thousands of times on previous flights. An unlikely scenario Not at all. The Aviation Safety Reporting System ASRS receives reports of such incidents almost monthly and these reports are probably a small fraction of the actual occurrences. Well perhaps one can argue no harm no foul the system protections worked as intended and no untoward consequences resulted from these .

• Quản trị kinh doanh
• Human factors in aviation
• Human factors in aircraft design
• Airline Vehicles and systems
• Nextgen commentary
• Sleep need and circadian rhythmicity