tailieunhanh - Corporate governance, pyramid ownership, and firm value: Evidence from Vietnam

This paper examines the relation among corporate governance practices, pyramid ownership structure, and firm value by using a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. The results are consistent regardless of whether companies have high or low family ownership. | Journal of Asian Business and Economic Studies Volumn 25, Special Issue 01 (2018), 85-102 Journal of Asian Business and Economic Studies Corporate governance, pyramid ownership, and firm value: Evidence from Vietnam TRAN THI HAI LYa, NGUYEN KIM DUCb a, b University of Economics HCMC ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Received 15 Mar. 2016 This paper examines the relation among corporate governance practices, pyramid ownership structure, and firm value by using a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. Using a sample of 103 non-financial firms listed on HOSE for the period from 2012 to 2014, and employing two-stage least square regression (2SLS) to deal with potential endogeneity, we find that some indicators, commonly adopted as a key components of corporate governance, such as size or independence of board of directors, are imperfect proxies for corporate governance practices. Our results indicate that it is better to employ a corporate governance index (CGI), including 117 criteria developed by Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Nagarajan (2012) since it allows for more comprehensive estimation of corporate governance. More interestingly, our results show that the pyramid ownership plays an important role in the effect of corporate governance on firm value. The results are consistent regardless of whether companies have high or low family ownership. Revised 30 Aug. 2016 Accepted 1 Jan. 2018 Available online 12 January 2018 JEL classifications: C24; D22; G32 KEYWORDS Corporate governance index Corporate governance Pyramid ownership a b Email: hailyth@*, correspondence author Email: 86 Tran Thi Hai Ly & Nguyen Kim Duc, JABES Vol. 25(Special 01), Feb. 2018, 85-102 1. Introduction Maximizing firm value is the most vital goal of any enterprises. In the modern corporations, shareholders and their representatives (board of directors) do not manage company directly. Instead, management teams are authorized to make decisions on

• Quản trị kinh doanh
• Corporate governance
• Pyramid ownership
• Firm value
• Consistent regardless
• Family ownership
• Family ownership concentration on the relationship
• The characteristics of board of directors and earnings management
• Directors and earnings management
• Family Ownership Concentration
• Board of Directors Characteristics
• Board characteristics
• Corporate activities
• Business development strategies
• Board size
• Firm ownership structures
• Pooled annual data
• Ghanaian listed firms
• Non foreign ownership
• family owned listed firms
• Ownership structure
• Ho Chi Minh Security Exchange data
• State owned enterprises
• Family businesses
• Stock market
• Director and officer liability insurance
• Family firms
• Litigation risk
• Officer insurance
• Demand for director
• Internal control
• Tax avoidance
• Environmental uncertainty
• Internal control on tax avoidance
• Business mediator
• Business trip
• Economic democracy
• Electronic business
• Government ownership