tailieunhanh - Lecture Personnel economics in practice - Chapter 3: Investment in skills

After completing this chapter, you will be able to address the following: When should firms pay for training? What is the optimum level of job training? What is the Age-Earnings profile, typically? How can a firm’s reputation affect its training costs? | Chapter 3: Investment in Skills 1 11/13/2014 Chapter 3: Investment in Skills Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Costs Interest Rates Career Length Specialization of Human Capital Effectiveness of Learning Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On-The-Job Training General versus Firm-Specific Human Capital Special case: Intellectual Property Who should pay for Training? Education Implicit cost to employee and benefit to employer Matching Recruiting Arbitrage On-the-job training General Human Capital Human Capital that is partly or fully firm specific Implications of On-the-Job training Turnover Investment Compensation Labor Market Thickness Firm Size Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary 2 11/13/2014 Chapter 3 – Investment in Skills After completing this chapter, you will be able to address the following: When should firms pay for training? What is the optimum level of job training? What is the Age-Earnings profile, typically? . | Chapter 3: Investment in Skills 1 11/13/2014 Chapter 3: Investment in Skills Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Costs Interest Rates Career Length Specialization of Human Capital Effectiveness of Learning Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On-The-Job Training General versus Firm-Specific Human Capital Special case: Intellectual Property Who should pay for Training? Education Implicit cost to employee and benefit to employer Matching Recruiting Arbitrage On-the-job training General Human Capital Human Capital that is partly or fully firm specific Implications of On-the-Job training Turnover Investment Compensation Labor Market Thickness Firm Size Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary 2 11/13/2014 Chapter 3 – Investment in Skills After completing this chapter, you will be able to address the following: When should firms pay for training? What is the optimum level of job training? What is the Age-Earnings profile, typically? How can a firm’s reputation affect its training costs? 3 11/13/2014 3 Investments in Education 4 11/13/2014 4 Stay-in-School Problem Ki: Wage in year I with diploma Ji: Wage in year I without diploma C0: Costs of staying in school, incurred now T: Total years to retirement r: Discount rate 5 11/13/2014 5 Stay-in-School Problem Benefits from investing in human capital Increased future income Costs Direct costs of training Forgone income while training Future benefits and costs must be discounted for an appropriate comparison 6 11/13/2014 6 The Wage-Schooling Relationship The salaries firms are willing to pay workers depend on the level of schooling. Properties of the wage-schooling relationship The wage-schooling plot is upward-sloping The slope of the wage vs. schooling indicates the increase in earnings associated with an additional year of education. The wage-schooling plot is concave, reflecting diminishing returns to schooling 7 11/13/2014 7 Wages vs. Schooling 0 13 14 18 12 30,000

• Kinh tế học
• Personnel economics
• Kinh tế học
• Personnel economics in practice
• Investment in skills
• Investments in education
• On the job training
• Rent sharing
• Setting hiring standards
• Making decisions
• Imperfect information
• Screening job applicants
• Worker’s productivity
• Signaling more formally
• Managing turnover
• Retention strategies
• Bidding for employees
• Decision making
• Benefits of centralization
• Benefits of decentralization
• Organizational structure
• Network structures
• Coordination mechanisms
• Job design
• Optimal job design
• Intrinsic motivation
• Advanced job design
• Group decision making
• Implementation of teams
• Performance evaluation
• Performance evaluation design
• Quantitative performance measures
• Rewarding performance
• Pay performance shape
• Performance pay methods
• Career based incentives
• Outside hiring
• Promotion probability
• Employee stock options
• Incentive pay
• Executive pay
• Improving employee sorting
• Implementation of benefits
• Cafeteria plans
• Human capital investment
• Internal markets
• Motivating creativity
• Employment relationship
• Perfect competition
• Imperfect competition
• Complex contracting
• school administration
• personnel administration
• business management
• production management
• personnel management
• Political economy