tailieunhanh - Lecture Public finance (10/e): Chapter 6 - Harvey S. Rosen, Ted Gayer

Chapter 6 - Political economy. The following will be discussed in this chapter: Political economy, direct democracy , feasibility of unanimity rules in reaching equilibrium, direct democracy majority voting rules, practical importance of double-peaked preferences, direct democracy the median voter theorem,. | POLITICAL ECONOMY Chapter 6 Political Economy The field that applies economic principles to the analysis of political decision-making. How well do various decision-making procedures translate the preferences of their citizens into collective action? 6- Direct Democracy Unanimity Rules r per year 0 0’ Adam’s share (SA) Eve’s share (SE) The Lindahl Model r* S* Given efficient quantity level r* and demand curves, Adam pays 0-S* and Eve pays 0’-S*. Unanimity can result in efficient level if Lindahl price – tax share per individual – were allowed 6- box and labels 1st click – Adam’s D 2nd click – Eve’s D 3rh click – equilibrium r and S Feasibility of Unanimity Rules in Reaching Equilibrium Practical problems Strategic behavior: do people vote sincerely or under report value to escape tax liability? Time to reach equilibrium given many citizens. 6- Direct Democracy Majority Voting Rules Majority voting rule – one more than half of the voters must favor a measure for | POLITICAL ECONOMY Chapter 6 Political Economy The field that applies economic principles to the analysis of political decision-making. How well do various decision-making procedures translate the preferences of their citizens into collective action? 6- Direct Democracy Unanimity Rules r per year 0 0’ Adam’s share (SA) Eve’s share (SE) The Lindahl Model r* S* Given efficient quantity level r* and demand curves, Adam pays 0-S* and Eve pays 0’-S*. Unanimity can result in efficient level if Lindahl price – tax share per individual – were allowed 6- box and labels 1st click – Adam’s D 2nd click – Eve’s D 3rh click – equilibrium r and S Feasibility of Unanimity Rules in Reaching Equilibrium Practical problems Strategic behavior: do people vote sincerely or under report value to escape tax liability? Time to reach equilibrium given many citizens. 6- Direct Democracy Majority Voting Rules Majority voting rule – one more than half of the voters must favor a measure for it to be approved However, majority voting does not always yield clear-cut results Given the voter preferences to the right, “B” always wins against opponents Voter Choice Brad Jen Angelina First A C B Second B B C Third C A A 6- Majority Voting Does Not Always Yield Clear-Cut Results: Double- vs. Single-Peaked Preferences Voting Paradox – Community preferences can be inconsistent even though individual’s preferences are consistent Given new preferences at the right: A vs. B → A wins B vs. C → B wins A vs. C → C wins Agenda Manipulation – Process of organizing order of votes to ensure a favorable outcome Cycling – when paired voting on more than two possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being reached 6- Voter Choice Brad Jen Angelina First A C B Second B A C Third C B A Graphing Preferences Missiles Utility A B C Brad Jen Angelina Single-peaked preferences Double-peaked preferences 6- axes and labels 1st click – Brad 2nd click – Jen 3rd .

• Tài chính doanh nghiệp
• Public finance
• Lecture Public finance
• Public expenditure
• Political economy
• Median voter model
• Special interest
• Public economy
• Public Economics
• Federal system
• Fiscal federalism
• Public good
• Public spending
• Public education
• Tiebout model
• Public sector economics
• Federal government
• The corporation tax
• Tax equity
• Public goods
• Public services
• Inflation taxation
• Education Increase Earnings
• Public education improves quality
• Interpreting deficit
• Burden of the debt
• Neoclassical model
• Legal framework
• Local governments
• Market mechanism
• Coase Theorem
• Public Responses
• Public employees
• Representative democracy
• Tools of positive analysis
• Positive analysis
• Empirical work
• Normative analysis
• Tools of normative analysis
• Welfare economics
• Nature of externalities
• Graphical analysis
• Cost benefit analysis
• Internal rate
• Benefit cost ratio
• Health care market
• Social insurance
• Risk pooling
• Moral hazard
• Market for health care
• Private health insurance
• Health insurance
• Social security
• Benefit structure
• Savings behavior
• Income redistribution
• Distributional dataissues
• Income inequality
• Expenditure programs
• Expenditure programs for the poor
• Work incentives
• Income distribution
• Tax incidence
• Partial equilibrium models
• Tax on consumption bundle
• Excess burden
• Demand curves
• Equitable taxation
• Optimal commodity taxation
• The ramsey rule
• Personal income tax
• Haig simons income
• Capital gains
• Personal taxation
• Human capital accumulation
• Labor supply