tailieunhanh - Effects of ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax on capital structures: Evidence from taiwan

Our study investigates how ultimate ownership structure and the corporate tax rate affect the equilibrium trade-off relation between manager ownership and debt in reducing agency costs. Considering the presence of the controlling shareholder, we find that higher corporate tax rates strengthen the trade-off relation between manager ownership and debt while higher control rights held by the controlling shareholder weaken it as well as the strengthening effect of corporate tax rate. Our study contributes to the literature by revealing tax and ultimate ownership structure dimensions and their interactions as additional determinants of corporate capital structure. | ARTICLE IN PRESS REVECO-00853 No of Pages 17 International Review of Economics and Finance xxx 2013 xxx-xxx Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect International Review of Economics and Finance journal homepage locate iref Effects of ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax on capital structures Evidence from Taiwan Cheng-Few LeeaJ Nan-Ting Kuob a Rutgers Business School Rutgers University Piscataway NJ 08854-8054 USA b National Central University Taiwan ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Article history Received 25 March 2012 Received in revised form 2 July 2013 Accepted 12 July 2013 Available online xxxx JEL classification G30 G32 G38 Our study investigates how ultimate ownership structure and the corporate tax rate affect the equilibrium trade-off relation between manager ownership and debt in reducing agency costs. Considering the presence of the controlling shareholder we find that higher corporate tax rates strengthen the trade-off relation between manager ownership and debt while higher control rights held by the controlling shareholder weaken it as well as the strengthening effect of corporate tax rate. Our study contributes to the literature by revealing tax and ultimate ownership structure dimensions and their interactions as additional determinants of corporate capital structure. 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords Capital structure Manager ownership Controlling shareholder Agency cost 1. Introduction Manager ownership and debt both reduce agency costs and they exist in equilibrium in a firm. This study investigates how ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax status affect this equilibrium. The effect of a firm s ownership structure on performance has received considerable attention in the literature. However few studies have examined the effects of ownership structure or corporate tax status on capital structure and they focus on the interaction between manager ownership and debt financing . Crutchley Hansen .

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