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Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces

Remove trim, bumpers etc as required. It can make the job easier in some cases if the bulk of the old panel is cut off first with a sharp chisel, leaving the welded areas much more accessible. Make a quick note of where and how it’s welded, so that the new panel can be welded in the same places. (Note: some wings may be welded on to raised mounts, making weld position important!) Now each spot weld needs to be located and cleanly removed. Purpose-made spotweld drills are available for this, which work on the basic principle of. | Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces Stephen Checkoway Damon McCoy Brian Kantor Danny Anderson Hovav Shacham and Stefan Savage University of California San Diego Karl Koscher Alexei Czeskis Franziska Roesner and Tadayoshi Kohno University of Washington Abstract Modern automobiles are pervasively computerized and hence potentially vulnerable to attack. However while previous research has shown that the internal networks within some modern cars are insecure the associated threat model requiring prior physical access has justifiably been viewed as unrealistic. Thus it remains an open question if automobiles can also be susceptible to remote compromise. Our work seeks to put this question to rest by systematically analyzing the external attack surface of a modern automobile. We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack vectors including mechanics tools CD players Bluetooth and cellular radio and further that wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control location tracking in-cabin audio exfiltration and theft. Finally we discuss the structural characteristics of the automotive ecosystem that give rise to such problems and highlight the practical challenges in mitigating them. 1 Introduction Modern cars are controlled by complex distributed computer systems comprising millions of lines of code executing on tens of heterogeneous processors with rich connectivity provided by internal networks e.g. CAN . While this structure has offered significant benefits to efficiency safety and cost it has also created the opportunity for new attacks. For example in previous work we demonstrated that an attacker connected to a car s internal network can circumvent all computer control systems including safety critical elements such as the brakes and engine 14 . However the threat model underlying past work including our own has been met with significant and justifiable criticism e.g. 1 3 16 . In .