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Continuous Asset Evaluation, Situational Awareness, and Risk Scoring Reference Architecture Report (CAESARS)

When talking about cryptography, we refer to senders and receivers wishing to exchange messages or plaintext by exchanging ciphertext. It is assumed that an eavesdropper reading ciphertext should not be able to extract corresponding plaintext. This characteristic is called confidentiality. The process performed by a sender to hide plaintext is called encryption, the reverse operation is called decryption. These processes are often expressed as mathematic functions or com- puting algorithms. The encryption and decryption algorithms together constitute a cipher. Cipher algorithms intended for general use cannot be secret. So cannot the eavesdropper just invoke the decryption process to extract plaintext? Ciphers use keys to solve this problem. The key. | w Homeland Security hninnniniinmnininn lOOHOOHOFEDERAL 1001110100010110101 0010101111001111 10100101001011 NETW0RK10100111000 1011000011101010110 1001010010011010100 __s R I Department of Homeland Security Federal Network Security Branch Continuous Asset Evaluation Situational Awareness and Risk Scoring Reference Architecture Report CAESARS September 2010 Version 1.8 Document No. MP100146 This page intentionally left blank. CAESARS September 2010 Table of Contents 1. Introduction.1 1.1 Objective.1 1.2 Intended Audience.1 1.3 References.2 1.4 Review of FISMA Controls and Continuous Monitoring.2 1.5 CAESARS Reference Architecture Concept of Operations.4 1.5.1 Definition.4 1.5.2 Operating Principles.4 1.5.3 Relationship of CAESARS to CyberScope.5 1.5.4 Cautionary Note - What Risk Scoring Can and Cannot Do.6 1.5.5 CAESARS and Risk Management.7 1.5.6 Risk Management Process.8 1.6 The CAESARS Subsystems.9 1.7 Document Structure The Architecture of CAESARS.10 1.7.1 CAESARS Sensor Subsystem.11 1.7.2 CAESARS Database Repository Subsystem.12 1.7.3 CAESARS Analysis Risk Scoring Subsystem.13 1.7.4 CAESARS Presentation and Reporting Subsystem.13 2. The Sensor Subsystem.14 2.1 Goals .14 2.1.1 Definitions.14 2.1.2 Operating Environment Assumptions for the Sensor Subsystem.15 2.2 Solution Concept for the Sensor Subsystem.16 2.2.1 Tools for Assessing Security Configuration Compliance.19 2.2.2 Security Assessment Tools for Assessing Patch-Level Compliance.23 2.2.3 Tools for Discovering and Identifying Security Vulnerabilities.25 2.2.4 Tools for Providing Virus Definition Identification.29 2.2.5 Other Sensors.30 2.2.6 Sensor Controller .32 2.3 Recommended Technology in the Sensor Subsystem.33 CAESARS iii September .