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Bargaining and Markets part 6

chúng ta cần phải xác định quá trình mà theo đó cá nhân phù hợp, các thông tin mà các cá nhân có tại mỗi điểm trong thời gian và thủ tục thương lượng đang được sử dụng. Chúng tôi xem xét một số khả năng trong các chương tiếp theo. Trong hầu hết các trường hợp (trường hợp ngoại lệ là mô hình tại mục 8.4), | 100 Chapter 5. Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players x H L 1 proposes x 1 0 cl 1 Cl accepts x i x cH xi 1 Ci xi 0 belief nH 1 0 2h proposes x CH x2 CH 1 Ci Ci 0 1 accepts x i x xi 1 xi CH 2l proposes x CH x2 CH 1 Ci Ci 0 1 accepts x i x Ch Cl xi 1 Ci Cl xi Cl Transitions Go to L if Player 2 rejects x with x CH CL xi x and counterproposes x CH x CH . Absorbing Absorbing Go to H if Player 2 takes an action inconsistent with the strategies of both 2H and 2L. Table 5.1 A separating sequential equilibrium of r nH for ci cl ci ch H 2ci ci Ch . The value of x satisfies CH x 1. When x 1 the strategy profile is a sequential equilibrium also for nH 2ci ci CH . uses a best response to the strategy of Player 1. Following our convention the initial state is the one in the leftmost column namely x . As always transitions between states occur immediately after the event that triggers them. Thus the transition to state L occurs after Player 2 makes an offer before Player 1 responds and for example a response of Player 2 that is inconsistent with the strategies of both Player 2H and Player 2L causes a transition to state H before Player 2 makes a counteroffer. Refer to Section 3.5 for a discussion of this method of representing an equilibrium.7 An 7The representation of the strategies presented in Table 5.1 as standard automata is more complex than the representation for the example given in Section 3.5 since the transition to state L depends on both the counterproposal and the previously rejected offer. For each state in the table we need to introduce a set of states indexed by i and x in which Player i has to respond to the offer x and another set indexed by the same variables in which Player i has to make a counteroffer given that the previously rejected proposal was x. 5.3 Sequential Equilibrium 101 extra line is included for Player 1 since the notion of sequential equilibrium includes a specification of Player 1 s belief as well as her actions. To see that players .