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Wage Insurance within German Firms: Do Institutions Matter?

The 2009 survey results presented in this report are revised, but are not materially different from the estimates published in the December 2009 report. To be consistent with the 2011 survey, the revised 2009 estimates reflect a change in how survey respondents are defined. In the 2009 report, any household whose respondent reported whether the household had a checking or a savings account was considered a survey respondent. In 2011, a respondent must also have reported that he or she is involved in the household’s finances in order to be consid- ered a survey respondent. The change in the definition of. | Discussion Paper No. 09-043 Wage Insurance within German Firms Do Institutions Matter Nicole Gurtzgen ZEW Zentrum fur Europăische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 09-043 Wage Insurance within German Firms Do Institutions Matter Nicole Gurtzgen Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server ftp ftp.zew.de pub zew-docs dp dp09043.pdf Die Discussion Papers dienen einer moglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beitrage liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar. Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other economists in orderto encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely responsible forthe contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. Non-technical summary Drawing on a large-scale German Linked EmployerEmployee data set this paper studies the extent to which employers insure workers against firm-level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether trade unions and works councils facilitate risk-sharing contracts between workers and firms. Given that the extent of insurance should critically depend on the frequency of the shock we adopt the identification strategy proposed by Guiso et al. 2005 which enables us to distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks. In addressing the role of collective bargaining coverage for the amount of wage insurance our results offer a remarkably consistent picture. Wage insurance is found to be particularly apparent for employers who are subject to collective wage agreements. Moreover the ability of collective contracts to provide wage insurance appears to decrease with plant size. While in small plants plant size 100 employees collective contracts are sufficient on their own to fully insure workers against transitory shocks they provide only partial insurance in